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Abstract.  Modern economics modeling practice involves highly 
unrealistic assumptions. Since testing such models is not always an easy 
enterprise, researchers face the problem of determining whether a result 
is dependent (or not) on the unrealistic details of the model. A solution 
for this problem is conducting robustness analysis. In its classical form, 
robustness analysis is a non-empirical method of confirmation – it raises 
our trust in a given result by implying it with from several different 
models. In this paper I argue that robustness analysis could be thought as 
a method of post-empirical failure. This form of robustness analysis 
involves assigning guilt for the empirical failure to a certain part of the 
model. Starting from this notion of robustness, I analyze a case of 
empirical failure from public choice theory or the economic approach of 
politics. Using the fundamental methodological principles of neoclassical 
economics, the first model of voting behavior implied that almost no one 
would vote. This was clearly an empirical failure. Public choice scholars 
faced the problem of either restraining the domain of their discipline or 
giving up to some of their neoclassical methodological features. The 
second solution was chosen and several different models of voting 
behavior were built. I will treat these models as a case for performing 
robustness analysis and I will determine which assumption from the 
original model is guilty for the empirical failure. 
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1. Unrealisticness of assumptions and robustness analysis 
 
1.1. Robustness analysis: a brief description 
 
In (2006) Weisberg started his paper on the problem of robustness 
analysis, by comparing physics with population biology: “Physical scientists 
can often construct and analyze models that are derived from fully developed, 
well-confirmed background theories. A scientist in possession of such a theory 
can be very confident about her ability to […] make accurate predictions with 
these models […]. Unfortunately, many phenomena, such as those studied by 
population biologists, have yet to be described by comprehensive theories, and 
it is unlikely that such theories will be developed in the near future [...]. Thus in 
population biology and other sciences that deal with highly complex systems, 
theorists generate multiple models for individual phenomena, all of which are 
idealized” (Weisberg, 2006, pp. 730-731).  
As population biology, modern social science lacks fully developed, well-
confirmed background theories and makes use of various idealized models. The 
drawback of this current practice is that researchers face the problem of 
determining “whether a result depends on the essentials of the model or on the 
details of the simplifying assumptions” (Levins, 1966, p. 423).  The problem 
that the unrealisticness of assumptions poses could be solved in several ways. 
The neoclassical economics answer was Milton Friedman`s (1966) F-twist: if 
the predictions implied by our idealized models pass the empirical tests, the 
unrealisticness of assumptions is not a problem at all. So, if an idealized model 
works, then its idealizations are not problematic. This solution has several 
shortcomings though, and I will focus on only one of them here
(1). It is not 
uncommon, as social scientist, to be in the position of having trouble to collect 
relevant data. In other words, testing our hypothesis is not always an easy 
enterprise. So we stick to the original problem: how do we know “how much 
distortion was introduced by each idealization” (Weisberg, 2006, p. 731)? 
Another answer came both from biology and economics
(2). To address the issue 
in hand, social scientists could use a non-empirical technique – robustness 
analysis.  
Robustness analysis applied to biological systems, as described by Levins 
(1966), is a method which treats “the same problem with several alternative 
models each with different simplifications but with a common biological 
assumption. Then, if the models, despite their different assumptions, lead to Robustness of public choice models of voting behavior 
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similar results we have what we call a robust theorem which is relatively free of 
the details of the model” (Levins, 1966, p. 423). In 1993, Levins gave a few 
new hints about the procedure he used in (1966). “The search for robustness as 
understood here is a valid strategy for separating the conclusions that depend on 
the common biological core of a model from the simplifications, distortions and 
omissions introduced to facilitate the analysis” (Levins, 1993, p. 554). The 
antecedent citation should be understood in the following way: first we should 
have several models and second, we should delimitate C, “the common part of 
all models, the core relationships we are either confident of or wish to test” 
(Levins, 1993, p. 553) and Vi, “the variable part of the model introduced for 
convenience or because it might hold for some cases” (Levins, 1993, p. 553) 
From these two parts of the models we could derive a robust result, which 
depends only by the common part C. So in Levins’ terms, “we may strengthen 
our confidence in the implications of some assumptions by using ensembles of 
models that share a common core of these assumptions but also differ as widely 
as possible in assumptions about other aspects. Then the more the variable part 
spans the range of plausible assumptions, the more valid the claim that the 
conclusions shared by all of them depend on the constant part” (Levins, 1993, 
p. 553). 
 
1.2. The goals of robustness analysis 
 
Starting from Levins (1966), (1993) and his description of robustness 
analysis, there are few topics worth discussing. First of them is the view that 
robustness analysis is a tool that helps us to strengthen our belief in a given 
result. The idea that robustness should increase the epistemic credence in a 
result it was implicitly or explicitly expressed by Wimsatt (1980), (1981) and 
others. This seemed to be the (original) goal of robustness analysis. But there is 
another possible goal. In 1980 Wimsatt stressed that when we perform 
robustness analysis, “The models must be sufficiently similar that we can 
compare them, isolating their similarities and differences. If we cannot do this, 
we cannot […] «assign praise and blame» to individual component 
assumptions. We can only praise or blame each model as a whole” (Wimsatt, 
1980, p. 310). This contention highlights that robustness has a feature of 
discovering the effects of each individual assumption from a model. So, the 
second goal of robustness analysis could be to assign the praise or the blame on 
particular assumptions. Both goals (strengthening the belief in a result and Mihai Ungureanu 
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assigning blame or praise) are non-empirical tools which can help us when 
testing if a result is difficult or even not possible. And as Weisberg, Kuorikoski, 
Lehtinen and Marchionni (2010) pointed out, the impossibility or the increased 
difficulty in collecting data is not an unusual occurrence in current scientific 
practice. There is, though, another way. Assume that we build a model and the 
data for testing it are easily available. Suppose for the sake of the argument that 
the result is not compatible with observable facts (it fails the empirical test). 
Borrowing from Wimsatt`s (1980) method, choosing similar enough alternative 
models could help us to assign the blame for failing the empirical test, to certain 
assumptions. For this goal, Wimsatt`s formulation should be further specified. 
What actually is needed to perform post testing robustness analysis is a special 
kind of similarity. I argued elsewhere (2013a) that this kind of robustness is a 
method of elimination and it involves incremental modifications. In other 
words, we should split the models we use into two parts. One part should 
always remain constant and the other should vary. Further, the variable part 
should have one and only one member. In other words, we can “assign blame” 
only by varying models in respect to one and only one assumption at the time. 
If the result varies under different specifications of an assumption then we 
could have some information about the reasons of the empirical failure.  
The second issue that should be discussed here concerns the problem of 
which kind of assumption should be varied. This brings on a discussion about 
peripheral and core assumptions. As Mäki (1994) noted, peripheral assumptions 
“serve to neutralize factors that are not regarded as central or essential to the 
phenomenon” (Mäki, 1994, p. 244). e.g. Galilei’s vacuum assumption, or the 
perfect divisibility of goods assumption in neoclassical economics. Core 
assumptions “serve to sort out what is believed to be the most central force [...]” 
(Mäki, 1994, p. 244); for example, Galilei’s statement that bodies are attracted 
by the gravitational field of the Earth, measured by parameter g, or the 
neoclassical economics assumption that agents maximize utility. Having this 
distinction in mind, and returning to Levins’ (original) formulation, robustness 
seemed to be about the artificial particularities of a model. In other terms it 
seemed to be about what above was described as peripheral assumption. 
Moreover, it seems to be about a particular kind of peripheral assumptions – 
tractability assumptions. Defined by Hindriks in 2005, 2006, “tractability is a 
matter of solubility or of the efficiency of a solution. A problem is intractable if 
it cannot be solved; a problem is more tractable with a certain assumption than 
without it if it can be solved more easily or efficiently in that case”   Robustness of public choice models of voting behavior 
	
83
	
83
(Hindriks, 2005, p. 392). Cartwright (2005, p. 131), Kuorikoski, Lehtinen, and 
Marchionni (2010, p. 548), strengthened the idea that robustness analysis 
should involve tractability assumptions (seen as peripheral assumptions). There 
are, though, two arguments against their position. First, the procedure I 
described above fits very well, both core and peripheral assumptions. If a model 
failed an empirical test there is no certainty that only our peripheral 
assumptions could be blamed. Second, even though many authors have seen 
tractability assumptions only as peripheral assumptions, there is no reason to 
think that a core assumption could not have some tractability features. In 2013b 
I argued that assumptions could have simultaneous functions. For example, the 
utility maximization postulate is a core assumption for many neoclassical 
models but it has tractability functions also. Without maximization, neoclassical 
models would be mathematically intractable. So, my contention here is that in 
order to perform robustness analysis as I define it, we should treat any 
unrealistic assumption as a possible suspect even if it is a core assumption with 
tractability functions in the model.  
 
2. Robustness of public choice voting behavior models  
 
In its classical form, robustness analysis is a single (or intra-author) or 
multiple authors’ (or trans-authors) endeavor. The first class refers to 
robustness analysis conducted by an author who is consciously modifying his 
own models to determine if they hold under alternative specifications of its 
unrealistic assumptions. The second class refers to series of models which were 
built by different authors, the last of them trying to secure the results of his 
predecessors. Neoclassical (economics and its manifestations into other social 
sciences
(3)), current research practice displays both forms. An example from the 
first class belongs to Olson (1965). The main argument of Olson’s analysis was 
that individuals would not participate in the production of collective goods in 
large groups. This result was derived using the homo oeconomicus behavioral 
assumption. Olson felt, though, that he could get the same result from using 
altruistic maximizers. As Olson beautifully put it: “A man who tried to hold 
back a flood with a pail would probably be considered more of a crank than a 
saint, even by those he was trying to help” (Olson, 1965, p. 64). So, even with 
altruistic maximizers the result holds. From the second class (multiple-authors 
robustness) a good example is Becker`s (1962) paper. Here, Becker explored 
the robustness of the traditional theory of household behavior (a theory built by Mihai Ungureanu 
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other authors) which predicted that “the demand curve for any commodity, real 
income held constant, must be negatively inclined” (Becker, 1962, pp. 2-3). For 
securing this result, Becker replaced the neoclassical postulate of utility 
maximization with two other behavioral specifications, irrational biased or 
random preferences. Becker argued that the result is robust because it held even 
without maximizing individuals
(4).  
In this paper I advocate a third way of doing robustness analysis. The case 
I choose for this endeavor starts with a model which failed to predict real 
behaviors. Therefore the subsequent models of the same phenomena were not 
meant to secure a result because there was no result to secure it in the first 
place. These latter models were actually meant to show that the approach is 
theoretically compatible with the observed facts. However, they could be used 
to isolate the sensitive parts of the original model and to assign the blame for 
the empirical failure. The voting behavior case from public choice theory fits 
this framework and it will make a good case study.  
 
2.1. Public choice theory – introductory remarks  
 
One of the most important aspects of the democratic process is citizens’ 
voting behavior. Defined as “the application of economics to the study of 
politics” (Shugart, Razzolini, 2001, p. xxii), public choice theory started to 
model this behavior in the middle of the 20
th century. Using the expected utility 
framework of modern micro (economics), Downs (1957) and later Tullock 
(1967), predicted that almost nobody will vote. This result was clearly at odds 
with reality. Economics standard tools apparently failed and its imperialistic 
claims
(5) seemed to be out of place. This failure was highlighted by many critics 
of the approach. The voting behavior case was often considered “the Achilles’ 
heel of public choice theory” (Udehn, 1992, p. 249), (Aldrich, 1997, p. 373). In 
a strong interpretation, this result meant that neoclassical economics (through 
one of its offspring, the public choice theory) is not fitted for explaining a very 
important behavior of the democratic process. In a weaker interpretation the 
problem was one of choosing between hard core methodological principles and 
peripheral ones. Of course, the opponents of public choice theory chose the 
strong interpretation and the supporters assumed the weaker one.  While the 
former position was one of rejecting the approach, the later tried to keep the 
most important neoclassical methodological principles by losing some less 
important methodological features. Public choice scholars took this later path Robustness of public choice models of voting behavior 
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and chose to sacrifice the homo oeconomicus assumption by the sake of the 
much more important assumption of utility maximization. In this way, at least 
two important subsequent voting accounts appeared: the expressive voter 
models and the altruistic voter models. They both gave away something in 
exchange for protecting the methodological core of the public choice theory and 
they both could be used to argue for the causal importance of the behavioral 
assumption. In what follows I present these models and argue that their results 
are unrobust with respect to some features of their behavioral assumption.   
 
2.2. The conventional model 
 
As mentioned above, the story of public choice modeling of voting 
behavior begins with Downs (1957) and Tullock (1967). I will label it as the 
pure rational choice voting model. A few notations are needed
(6): V stands for 
the set of actual voters in a particular election with v being the cardinality of V, 
R represents the reward that an individual voter receives from his act of voting, 
B is the differential benefit that an individual voter receives from the success of 
his more preferred candidate over his less preferred one, P is the probability 
that an individual, by voting, brings about the benefit B, with 0   1  and C 
is the cost of the act of voting. With these notations, the calculus of voting 
formula is:          . If   0 , it is rational to vote and if   0 , it is not 
rational to vote. If v is a large number and   0 , 	 the calculus of voting will 
predict zero or low turnout. Actually the probability (P) of being the decisive 
voter is so low that scholars like Meehl (1977), Sobel and Wagner (2004) 
anecdotally commented that it is more likely to be killed driving to the polls 
than being decisive. This conclusion was puzzling since the beginning because 
it was clear that actually many people vote. Are they irrational? In the following 
sections, I explore two negative public choice responses to this question. 
 
2.3. The expressive voter model 
 
Brennan and Buchanan (1984), Brennan and Lomasky (1985), (1987) 
developed the expressive voter theory as an alternative to the classical approach 
to voting behavior. The theory starts with Buchanan’s (1954) argument that 
there is a difference between individual’s voting choice and his/her choice in 
the market. As Buchanan (1954) noted, in the market, individuals choose 
between outcomes. This is not true about voting because in this case the Mihai Ungureanu 
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outcome depends on the actions of all the other individuals. This means that 
voting is not instrumental in the same way market choices are. From this, 
citizens could have non-instrumental reasons for voting. As Brennan and 
Buchanan (1984) argued, the latter had expressive reasons for voting. In 
expressive account, voters might be seen as booing and cheering spectators at a 
sports event. They are not supporting their teams because they will, by doing 
so, affect the outcome of the game. These expressions of support or lack of 
support for a sports team or for political candidates are not instrumental but 
they are rational. Another point that needs to be made is that people are not only 
booing and cheering candidates when they vote. In (1985) Brennan and 
Lomasky building on Tullock’s (1971) and on Adam Smith’s (1759) argued 
that voting was an opportunity to express moral views that otherwise it would 
be costly to express. Talking about charity is cheap, but voting about it is also 
cheap: „Bakers who donate their wares to the hungry forgo the income that 
could have been achieved through selling the bread and will soon be out of 
business. But bakers who vote in favor of a program to compel bakers to donate 
some share of their output to the hungry do not bear a similar cost. All that is 
given up is the opportunity to vote against the program – because the vote has 
negligible impact on the political outcome” (Brennan, Lomaky, 1985, p. 198). 
Starting from all these, the two key points of the expressive account of voting 
behavior are that voters have true knowledge about the p-term and that they will 
choose to express otherwise costly views by talking and voting about them. If 
voting is cheap then people will buy it. The conclusion is, of course, that 
rational expressive people will vote
(7).  
 
2.4. The altruistic voter model 
 
The homo oeconomicus assumption, used in the pure rational choice 
model of voting, is the behavioral rule in neoclassical economics models. The 
expressive account of voting behavior traded, as Brennan (2008) argued, the 
instrumental feature of homo oeconomicus for saving the more important, 
maximization assumption. Another trade is still possible. We could keep the 
maximization and the instrumental behavior assumptions and give up (totally or 
partly) to the self-interest feature of rationality. As Buchanan, Tullock (1962), 
Becker (1976), Sen (1977), Sugden (1982), Andreoni (1989), (1990) and others 
argued, altruism could also operationalize the utility maximization principle of 
modern economics. For the voting behavior case I will shortly review one such Robustness of public choice models of voting behavior 
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attempt. The first public choice mention of altruistic voting behavior was in 
Buchanan`s (1954) paper. He briefly noted that in a voting situation people 
could think about the welfare of the whole group. Later, Jankowski (2002), 
(2007) and Edlin, Gelman, Kaplan (2007) took this intuition to the scale of an 
altruistic model of voting behavior.  
Edlin, Gelman, Kaplan (2007) began their analysis of voting behavior 
from the notion of individuals with social preferences. To have such preference 
means that when voting, you are considering the utility received by other 
members of the community. So, building on the pure rational choice model of 
voting behavior, Edlin, Gelman, Kaplan defined two kinds of benefits that an 
individual could receive by voting. The first is its self-interested benefit denoted 
by     , and the second is its altruistic benefit denoted by     . With these 
notations, the total benefit that a voter receives is given by the formula: 
                  – where   is a discount factor which reflects the intuition 
that the altruistic benefit is a fraction of the self-interested benefit. If   0  then 
the voter is purely self-interested; if   0  then the voter has social preferences. 
For the first case the prediction of the pure rational choice model of voting 
behavior stands: almost nobody votes. For the second case though, the 
implication is that much more people vote. If I receive a benefit of, let’s say 
  0 . 5 , then, even with a big electorate it will be probable that I vote. So the 
most important assumption here is that   0  for most of the voters. 
 
3. Robustness of the voting behavior case: discussion 
 
Before any other qualification, I will rewrite the models in a form more 
suitable for robustness analysis. I will denote the first model by A, the second 
by B, the third by C, the behavioral assumptions by I, the structural assumptions 
by II and the two possible results by R1 (not voting) and R2 (voting). 
A The classical model of voting behavior  
I. Behavioral assumptions:  
I.a1) Voters are homo oeconomicus; 
I.a1.1) The formal behavioral assumption: voters are utility maximizers; 
I.a1.2) The 1
st operationalization: voters are self-interested; 
I.a1.3) The 2
nd operationalization: voters behave instrumentally. 
II. Structural assumptions: 
II.a1) The mass elections assumption: the number V  of voters is very 
large; Mihai Ungureanu 
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II.a2) The low cost assumption: voting is a low cost decision. 
III. Hidden or implied assumptions:  
III.a.1) The behavioral uniformity assumption: all agents behave as 
described in I. 
 
B. The expressive voter model 
I. Behavioral assumptions:  
I.b1) Voters are expressive; 
I.b1.1) The formal behavioral assumption: voters are utility maximizers; 
I.b1.2) The 1
st operationalization: voters are self-interested; 
I.b1.3) The 2
nd operationalization: voters behave non-instrumentally. 
II. Structural assumptions: 
II.b1) The mass elections assumption: the number V of voters is very large; 
II.b2) The low cost assumption: voting is a low cost decision. 
III. Hidden or implied assumptions: 
III.b.1) The behavioral uniformity assumption: all agents behave as 
described in I. 
 
C. The altruistic voter model  
I. Behavioral assumptions:  
I.c1) Voters are a mixture of altruism and egoism; 
I.c1.1) The formal behavioral assumption: voters are utility maximizers; 
I.c1.2) The 1
st operationalization: voters are self-interested but they have 
altruistic motivations also; 
I.c1.3) The 2
nd operationalization: voters behave instrumentally. 
II. Structural assumptions: 
II.c1) The mass elections assumption: the number V of voters is very large; 
II.c2) The low cost assumption: voting is a low cost decision. 
III. Hidden or implied assumptions: 
III.c.1) The behavioral uniformity assumption: all agents behave as 
described in I. 
The results:  →   ,  →   ,  →   . 
 
The models of voting behavior presented above have at least three 
properties that made them suitable for my version of robustness analysis. The 
first is their simple structure. There are few assumptions about factors which 
are exogenous to the individuals i.e. few structural assumptions. Together with Robustness of public choice models of voting behavior 
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the also few behavioral assumptions, they are very easy to manipulate in a 
robustness analysis. The second desirable property is that all structural 
assumptions are realistic. Modern democracies are almost everywhere capable 
to organize the elections so that voting is cheap. The probability to be decisive 
is also usually low. Modern democracies may be, in principle, as large as 
possible, and usually they are large. If V is large, then the probability of being 
decisive is low. This makes the P term to be realistic for almost any modern 
democratic state. Having realistic structural assumptions facilitates the analysis 
because there are fewer variations that should be studied. Finally, the third 
property is that the models are similar enough to allow the detection of 
problematic assumptions. This similarity is in terms of a common model 
structure. Here, there are two options. If we treat I – the set of behavioral 
assumptions – as having a single member (I = I.a1, I = I.b1 and I = I.c1) then 
we could perform robustness analysis on all three models at once. Still, if we 
consider that I’s cardinality is three (as presented above) then the robustness 
analysis should be performed by grouping model A with model B and model A 
with model C.  
Choosing the first way – performing robustness on all three models at 
once – is easy. Taking the behavioral assumption as the variable part of the 
model and the structural assumptions as their constant part, we get    but also 
  . The conclusion is straightforward: the behavioral assumption is to be 
blamed for the empirical fallacy of the classical model. So using homo 
oeconomicus described as a self-interested, instrumental utility maximizer is 
problematic. The second way involves as I noted above, grouping A with B and 
A with C. For A and B the constant part is II, III, I.a1.1 ˗ I.b1.1 and I.a1.2 ˗ 
I.b1.2. The variable part consists in I.a1.3 ˗ I.b1.3. Changing I.a1.3 into I.b1.3 
changes the result from    into   , The same goes with A and C. The constant 
part is II, III, I.a1.1 ˗ I.c1.1 and I.a1.3 ˗ I.c1.3. The variable part consists in 
I.a1.2 ˗ I.b1.2. Changing I.a1.2 into I.b1.2 changes the result from    into   . 
So both I.a1.2 and I.a1.3 are sensitive to alternative specifications. This means 
that they are both to be blamed for A’s empirical failure.  
So, it is clear from the above discussion that the results are variable under 
different behavioral assumptions. The problem is magnified by adding non-
public choice behavioral assumptions. For example, if we replace the homo 
oeconomicus assumption with irrational biased pro-voting individuals then the 
result changes again. The same happens with irrational random voters. My 
primary contention here is therefore that the problem of failed prediction of the Mihai Ungureanu 
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first model of voting behavior was produced by its behavioral assumptions. The 
whole I.a1 or its parts I.a1.2 and I.a1.3 are not peripheral assumptions, and 
even though they have tractability functions, they are actually core assumptions 
and they are part of the model’s causal mechanism. Another important part in 
deriving    is  III, or what I called hidden or implied assumption. This is 
actually a feature of the whole neoclassical economics and politics: it assumes 
that there is behavioral uniformity across the entire model world. All agents are 
either homo oeconomicus or expressive and so on. If we change this feature and 
allow behavioral diversity, deduction will be impossible. Without knowing how 
many people are in each behavioral class we won’t be able to predict turnout. 
We would get though (maybe) a better representation of the real world. Of 
course this would imply trading tractability and deduction-prediction for 
representation, but I won’t discuss this problem here.  
 
 
 
Notes 
	
(1)  For other critiques for Friedman’s position see, for example, the Musgrave-Mäki-Hindriks 
typology of assumptions and my (2013b) subsequent discussion of it. 
(2)  Even though until recent times it was theorized only by biologists. 
(3)  In (1984) Stigler argued that neoclassical economics exported its core methodological 
principles into the traditional domain of other social sciences. He labeled this as being 
economics imperialism. 
(4)  Becker’s result held with irrational households because it was implied by a structural 
variable: everybody`s revenues are limited so, when the prices are high, people – rational or 
irrational – will buy less.  
(5)  See note (3).  
(6)  I use a part of Riker’s and Ordeshook (1968) notations because they are more suited for my 
analysis than Downs’ (1957) original notations.   
(7)  They will even do so despite their interests. Brennan and Lomasky (1985) offer an example 
of voting for declaring war to a nation’s foe. Nobody wants this war, but voters will express 
their patriotism and disdain for the antagonist and the result will be one that is in nobody’s 
interest. 
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